Gdańsk GNSS Interference — Three in Four Aircraft Reporting Degraded Navigation, August 2026
- Gdańsk (GDN) is operating near normal — GPS interference is a navigation-precision and workload issue, not an airport closure; check your airline on the day.
- The Gulf of Gdańsk sits in a persistent GNSS-interference zone that has run for well over a year, concentrated on the Baltic coast toward Kaliningrad — the effect gets stronger, not weaker, eastward.
- Aircraft do not rely on satellite navigation alone: inertial systems and ground-based aids (ILS, VOR/DME) back it up — so a degraded GNSS cell mostly means possible loss of GPS-based approaches and higher workload, occasionally a diversion in poor weather.
Advisory timeline — how active is this episode
This is not a runway problem and not a throughput problem — it is a navigation-integrity problem. Every ADS-B aircraft broadcasts a Navigation Integrity Category (NIC): a self-reported measure of how far it trusts its own position. When satellite navigation is jammed or spoofed, receivers drop that integrity, and the NIC value falls. Over the 1°×1° cell centred on 54°N 18°E (Gdańsk and the Gulf of Gdańsk), the share of tracked aircraft broadcasting a low NIC ran between 71.2% and 84.0% every day from 10–17 August. Honest window: this per-cell integrity dataset begins on 10 August, so we show eight full days and make no claim about a longer baseline. Counts are a floor — only aircraft the crowdsourced network received are included. The band never broke and no escalation signal fired — this brief is now closed as a documented steady state (see the close-out below). Daily degraded-GNSS share:
Fig. 1 — Daily share of tracked aircraft broadcasting a low Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) in the 54°N 18°E cell (Gdańsk / Gulf of Gdańsk) · Data as of 18 Aug 2026, 18:45 UTC · daily series complete through 17 Aug · Source: ADS-B Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) reports, crowdsourced receiver networks (adsb.lol) · FIR-level ratios from gpsjam.org (J. Wiseman / ADS-B Exchange, CC-BY).
Airports in the exposure zone
| Airport | Size | Exposure | FIR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gdańsk Lech Wałęsa (GDN) | large | — · centre of detected cell · operating near normal | EPWW |
| Kaliningrad Khrabrovo (KGD) | large | — · deeper in the interference zone (FIR ~34.7%) | UMKK |
| Palanga International (PLQ) | medium | — · northern edge of the zone (FIR ~20.4%) | EYVL |
Distance alone does not determine impact — wind direction and the flight levels the ash reaches decide which airports and routes are affected on a given day. FIR = Flight Information Region.
What it means for flights
What a low NIC actually measures — and what it does not. The Navigation Integrity Category is a field every ADS-B aircraft transmits: it describes how tightly the aircraft trusts its own reported position. GNSS jamming and spoofing push receivers to lower that figure or fall back to inertial reckoning, and the broadcast NIC drops. A cell where three in four aircraft report low NIC is a cell where the satellite-navigation environment is degraded — not a cell where aircraft are lost or off course. And because we only see aircraft the crowdsourced receiver network picks up, every share here is a floor, not a full census.
Interference degrades navigation; it does not ground flights. Airliners do not depend on GPS alone. Inertial reference systems carry position through a jammed patch, and ground-based aids — ILS, VOR/DME — remain available for approach and en-route navigation, with published contingency procedures for GNSS loss. The real cost is precision and workload: satellite-based (RNP/RNAV) approaches can become unavailable, approach minima rise, and in poor visibility that can mean holding or a diversion to an alternate. That is exactly why Gdańsk keeps running near-normal movement counts while most aircraft over the cell flag degraded GNSS.
FIR-average hides the coast — why the cell-level number matters. By the FIR-wide gpsjam.org measure, the whole Warsaw FIR (EPWW) sits at about 3.1% jamming (7-day average) — because that average pools a hot Baltic coast with quiet inland Poland. Zoom to the 54°N 18°E cell over Gdańsk and the degraded share is roughly twenty times that. Both figures are true; only the cell-level one tells a dispatcher what the Gulf of Gdańsk looks like today. Neighbouring cells toward Kaliningrad run higher still — the Kaliningrad FIR (UMKK) averages ~34.7% and Palanga's Vilnius FIR (EYVL) ~20.4% on the same 7-day window.
A persistent zone, watched for change — not a fresh alarm. The southern Baltic around Kaliningrad has carried elevated GNSS interference for well over a year (background: Baltic GPS-jamming escalation and how GPS jamming works). Gdańsk sits on the western edge of it. Our automated multi-signal analysis watches for change rather than presence: the degraded share spreading west and inland, a shift from jamming (signal loss) toward spoofing (a coherent false position), or interference reaching approach paths in low-visibility conditions. This page and the GDN brief update from the same monitoring cycle.
What the data showed — close-out, 18 August. This brief opened on a persistent interference zone and closes on one — that is the finding. Across all eight days on record (10–17 August), the share of tracked aircraft broadcasting low navigation integrity over the Gdańsk cell (54°N 18°E) stayed inside a 71.2%–84.0% band: 74.3% on 14 August (130 of 175 aircraft), 71.2% on 15 August (111 of 156), 76.6% on 16 August (141 of 184) and 84.0% on 17 August (121 of 144). The FIR-level picture (gpsjam.org measure) did not move either: the Warsaw FIR (EPWW) averaged ~3.1% over the closing week — 2.9% on 17 August, below its ~3.6% 90-day average — while the deeper zone stayed hot, with the Kaliningrad FIR (UMKK) near ~34.7% and the Vilnius FIR (EYVL) near ~20.4% on the same 7-day window (UMKK's figure rests on small daily samples of roughly a hundred tracked aircraft, so treat it as indicative rather than precise). Throughput never flinched: Gdańsk averaged about 174 movements a day over the closing week, above its ~119-movement baseline (one receiver-coverage gap day, 15 August, sits inside that window and is flagged in the airport brief). None of the change signals set out above fired — no westward or inland spread of the degraded share, no shift from jamming toward spoofing, no interference-attributed approach disruption at GDN. With eight days of data showing a stable, chronic interference environment and no escalation, we are closing this brief as a documented steady state. The southern-Baltic interference floor persists and remains tracked in the GDN brief and the live regional GPS-interference map. All aircraft figures are aggregates of ADS-B navigation-integrity reports from crowdsourced receiver networks — a floor, not a total.
Passenger questions, answered from the data
Aircraft do not navigate by GPS alone — inertial systems and ground-based aids (ILS, VOR/DME) back it up, and crews follow published procedures for GNSS loss. We publish the measured picture (the share of aircraft reporting degraded navigation integrity); whether to depart, reroute or divert is a decision for operators and aviation authorities. As of mid-August 2026, Gdańsk was operating near its normal traffic level and no interference-related closure was in effect. This brief was closed on 18 August after eight days of monitoring showed a stable interference environment with no escalation; the persistent zone remains tracked in the live tools and the GDN brief.
Not as a rule. Observed traffic at Gdańsk (GDN) stayed at or above its normal level through the whole 10–17 August window — a ~174 movements/day 7-day average at the 18 August close, above its ~119-movement baseline — even while most aircraft over the cell flagged degraded GNSS, because interference is a navigation-precision and workload issue rather than an airport closure. Isolated delays or diversions are possible when a satellite-based approach is unavailable in poor weather — check your airline's status on the day of travel.
NIC is the Navigation Integrity Category — a value each ADS-B aircraft broadcasts describing how much it trusts its own position. When GNSS is jammed or spoofed, that value falls. We aggregate NIC reports collected by crowdsourced ADS-B receiver networks into a per-cell daily share of aircraft reporting low integrity. Because it only counts aircraft the network received, the share is a floor — real exposure may be higher, not lower.
For media — the full kit
Everything on this page — charts, CSV, quotes — is published under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to FlySafe.zone. Charts come in dark (social/web) and light (print/light layouts) versions; attribution and license are embedded in every file.
“Between 10 and 13 August 2026, roughly three in four tracked aircraft over the Gdańsk cell (54°N 18°E) broadcast a low Navigation Integrity Category — the signature of a degraded GNSS environment over the Gulf of Gdańsk — while the Warsaw FIR as a whole averaged just 3.4% because the interference concentrates on the Baltic coast toward Kaliningrad, with flights operating near normal, according to flight-monitoring service FlySafe.zone.”
Boilerplate — about the source (for your article footer)
FlySafe.zone monitors airspace risk and observed airport activity worldwide: 334 flight-information regions scored daily, GPS-interference signals, volcanic-ash exposure and daily observed movements at 493 airports from the crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network. Methodology: flysafe.zone/methodology.
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