GNSS Interference over Eastern Latvia — Roughly Three in Four Aircraft Flagging Degraded Navigation near Riga, August 2026
- Riga (RIX) is operating near normal — observed movements stayed at their ~201/day baseline right through the interference window; GPS interference is a navigation-precision and workload issue, not an airport closure. Check your airline on the day.
- The degraded-GNSS zone sits over eastern Latvia toward the border and is part of a persistent Baltic interference field that has run for well over a year, getting stronger, not weaker, eastward toward Kaliningrad and the Russian border.
- Aircraft do not rely on satellite navigation alone — inertial systems and ground-based aids (ILS, VOR/DME) back it up — so a degraded GNSS cell mostly means possible loss of GPS-based approaches and higher crew workload, occasionally a diversion in poor weather.
Advisory timeline — how active is this episode
This is not a runway problem and not a throughput problem — it is a navigation-integrity problem. Every ADS-B aircraft broadcasts a Navigation Integrity Category (NIC): a self-reported measure of how far it trusts its own position. When satellite navigation is jammed or spoofed, receivers drop that integrity and the NIC value falls. Over the 1°×1° cell centred on 57°N 25°E (eastern Latvia, north-east of Riga toward the Estonian border), the share of tracked aircraft broadcasting a low NIC ran between 68.8% and 84.6% every day from 10–17 August — 80% (24 of 30 aircraft) on the final day. Two honesty notes: this per-cell integrity series begins on 10 August, so we show eight full days and make no claim about a longer baseline for this specific cell; and the cell carries relatively little traffic (16–31 tracked aircraft per day), so each share is a floor on a small sample — real exposure may be higher, not lower. The band never broke upward and the degraded zone never spread toward the Riga terminal area — this brief is now closed as a documented steady state (see the close-out below). Daily degraded-GNSS share:
Fig. 1 — Daily share of tracked aircraft broadcasting a low Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) in the 57°N 25°E cell (eastern Latvia, north-east of Riga toward the Estonian border) · Data as of 19 Aug 2026, 00:50 UTC · Source: ADS-B Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) reports, crowdsourced receiver network (adsb.lol) · FIR-level ratios from gpsjam.org (J. Wiseman / ADS-B Exchange, CC-BY).
Airports in the exposure zone
| Airport | Size | Own-cell flag rate (17 Aug) | FIR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Riga International (RIX) | large | — · ≈78% of aircraft flagged (own cell) · traffic at baseline | EVRR |
| Lennart Meri Tallinn (TLL) | medium | — · ≈68% of aircraft flagged (own cell) | EETT |
| Vilnius International (VNO) | medium | — · ≈43% of aircraft flagged (own cell) | EYVL |
Distance alone does not determine impact — wind direction and the flight levels the ash reaches decide which airports and routes are affected on a given day. FIR = Flight Information Region.
What our monitoring shows: Riga traffic ran normal while the navigation layer lit up
FlySafe tracks observed departures and arrivals at 493 airports from crowdsourced ADS-B receiver data. Observed counts are a floor, not a total — receiver coverage varies — but an airport measured against its own baseline is a reliable shape. Riga's last 30 days:
Fig. 2 — Observed daily movements at RIX, 18 Jul – 16 Aug (latest complete UTC day). Data as of 19 Aug 2026, 00:50 UTC · Source: FlySafe monitoring (ADS-B receiver network).
- 30-day baseline: ~201 observed movements/day at Riga (RIX).
- Through the interference window (10–16 Aug): 195 / 198 / 184 / 195 / 204 / — / 181 observed movements — no collapse and no downward drift as the degraded-GNSS share persisted overhead. The 15 Aug slot is a receiver-coverage gap (data incomplete for that UTC day), so we mark it rather than plot a misleading low; observed counts are a floor, not a total. (The 13 Aug figure, which read 97 in an earlier update, has since backfilled to 195 — a coverage artefact, exactly as flagged at the time.)
- The point: GNSS interference is invisible in the movement count. It surfaces in the navigation-integrity layer — aircraft broadcasting degraded position quality — not in whether flights depart. That is exactly why Riga's movement bars sit at baseline while the cell above runs 69–85% every day.
This is the opposite shape from a typhoon or an ash closure, where movements collapse and snap back. Live view: RIX airport brief.
What it means for flights
What a low NIC actually measures — and what it does not. The Navigation Integrity Category is a field every ADS-B aircraft transmits: it describes how tightly the aircraft trusts its own reported position. GNSS jamming and spoofing push receivers to lower that figure or fall back to inertial reckoning, and the broadcast NIC drops. A cell where roughly three in four aircraft report low NIC is a cell where the satellite-navigation environment is degraded — not a cell where aircraft are lost or off course. And because we only see aircraft the crowdsourced receiver network picks up — here just 16–31 a day over this cell — every share is a floor on a small sample, not a full census.
Interference degrades navigation; it does not ground flights. Airliners do not depend on GPS alone. Inertial reference systems carry position through a jammed patch, and ground-based aids — ILS, VOR/DME — remain available for approach and en-route navigation, with published contingency procedures for GNSS loss. The real cost is precision and workload: satellite-based (RNP/RNAV) approaches can become unavailable, approach minima rise, and in poor visibility that can mean holding or a diversion to an alternate. That is exactly why Riga keeps running near-baseline movement counts while most aircraft over the cell flag degraded GNSS.
FIR-average hides the hot east — why the cell-level number matters. By the FIR-wide gpsjam.org measure, the whole Latvia FIR (EVRR) closed the window at about 9.8% jamming (7-day average, moderate, medium confidence) — stable, and essentially at its ~10.3% 90-day norm — because that average pools a heavily degraded eastern half with quieter western Latvia over the Baltic Sea. Zoom to the 57°N 25°E cell and the degraded share is roughly eight times that. Both figures are true at their own scale; only the cell-level one tells a dispatcher what eastern Latvia looked like through the window. The gradient continues across the region: neighbouring cells toward the Russian border run 90–100%, and by FIR the Lithuania (EYVL) region averages ~20.4% (elevated) and Kaliningrad (UMKK) ~34.7% (severe, still above its 90-day norm) on the same 7-day window.
A persistent zone, watched for change — not a fresh alarm. The Baltic around Kaliningrad and the eastern approaches has carried elevated GNSS interference for well over a year (background: Baltic GPS-jamming escalation and how GPS jamming works; see also our GNSS explainer). Eastern Latvia sits inside it. Our per-cell series here is only eight days deep, so we frame this as presence within a known field, not a new spike — the FIR-level ratio has held steady. Automated multi-signal analysis watches for change rather than presence: the degraded share spreading west toward the Riga terminal area, a shift from jamming (signal loss) toward spoofing (a coherent false position), or interference reaching approach paths in low-visibility conditions. This page and the RIX brief update from the same monitoring cycle.
What the data showed — close-out, 19 August. This brief documented presence within a persistent interference field, and that is how it ends. Across the full 10–17 August window the share of aircraft broadcasting a low NIC over the 57°N 25°E cell never left its 68.8–84.6% band — 76.7% on 16 August (23 of 30 aircraft) and 80.0% on 17 August (24 of 30). The geography held its shape: Riga's own airspace cell stayed inside its ~70–78% range and ended at 78% on 17 August (107 of 138 aircraft), with the Tallinn cell at 68% and Vilnius at 43%. At FIR scale nothing broke out: the Latvia FIR (EVRR) closed the window at a ~9.8% 7-day average against a ~10.3% 90-day norm (medium confidence) — essentially unchanged — while the regional gradient persisted eastward: Lithuania (EYVL) ~20.4% and Kaliningrad (UMKK) ~34.7% on the same 7-day window, the latter still well above its ~28.8% 90-day average. Throughput never moved: Riga averaged about 193 observed movements a day over the closing week (a 15 August receiver-coverage gap day is excluded from that average), in line with its ~201 baseline, and the live RIX brief reads traffic as normal. None of the escalation signals set out above fired — no spread of the degraded zone toward the Riga terminal area, no FIR-level breakout, no shift toward a spoofing signature, and no suspensions of satellite-based approach procedures surfaced in our monitoring. With eight days of data showing a stable share inside a known persistent field and zero operational signature at the airport, we are closing this brief as a documented steady state. The Baltic interference environment itself persists — it has run for well over a year — and remains tracked in the RIX brief and the live regional GPS-interference map. All cell-level figures are FlySafe aggregates of ADS-B Navigation Integrity Category reports from a crowdsourced receiver network (adsb.lol) — a floor, not a total; FIR-level ratios from gpsjam.org (J. Wiseman / ADS-B Exchange, CC-BY 4.0).
Passenger questions, answered from the data
Aircraft do not navigate by GPS alone — inertial systems and ground-based aids (ILS, VOR/DME) back it up, and crews follow published procedures for GNSS loss. We publish the measured picture (the share of aircraft reporting degraded navigation integrity); whether to depart, reroute or divert is a decision for operators and aviation authorities. This brief closed on 19 August 2026 as a documented steady state: through 17 August Riga was operating in line with its normal ~201-movement traffic level and no interference-related closure was in effect. For the current picture, see the live RIX brief.
Not as a rule. Observed traffic at Riga (RIX) held at its normal ~201 movements/day level through mid-August even while roughly three in four aircraft over the eastern-Latvia cell flagged degraded GNSS, because interference is a navigation-precision and workload issue rather than an airport closure. Isolated delays or diversions are possible when a satellite-based approach is unavailable in poor weather — check your airline's status on the day of travel.
NIC is the Navigation Integrity Category — a value each ADS-B aircraft broadcasts describing how much it trusts its own position. When GNSS is jammed or spoofed, that value falls. We aggregate NIC reports collected by a crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network into a per-cell daily share of aircraft reporting low integrity. Because it only counts aircraft the network received — here 16–31 a day over this cell — the share is a floor on a small sample: real exposure may be higher, not lower.
For media — the full kit
Everything on this page — charts, CSV, quotes — is published under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to FlySafe.zone. Charts come in dark (social/web) and light (print/light layouts) versions; attribution and license are embedded in every file.
“From 10 to 15 August 2026, roughly three in four tracked aircraft over the 57°N 25°E cell in eastern Latvia, north-east of Riga, broadcast a low Navigation Integrity Category — the signature of a degraded GNSS environment — while the Latvia flight-information region as a whole averaged about 9.6% over the week because the interference concentrates on the eastern approaches toward Kaliningrad, with Riga's observed traffic holding at its normal ~201-movement baseline, according to flight-monitoring service FlySafe.zone.”
Boilerplate — about the source (for your article footer)
FlySafe.zone monitors airspace risk and observed airport activity worldwide: 334 flight-information regions scored daily, GPS-interference signals, volcanic-ash exposure and daily observed movements at 493 airports from the crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network. Methodology: flysafe.zone/methodology.
Need a different cut of the data, a comment, or numbers for another airport? Leave an email — we answer fast during active events.

