GNSS Interference over Beirut — Aviation Impact, August 2026
- Beirut (BEY) was operating normally through the spike — GNSS interference degrades navigation avionics, it does not stop flights, and BEY held around its usual ~151 movements a day in our feed.
- The 21 August spike is in the broad low-NIC flag over the Beirut cell (72%), a breakout above the 11%–53% band the cell held earlier in the month; the stricter jamming-grade measure for the whole Beirut FIR was about 33%, but that FIR is thinly covered and we treat the number as low-confidence.
- What we measure is navigation integrity, not safety: seven in ten aircraft in the Beirut cell flagged degraded GPS confidence, but go/no-go decisions belong to operators and authorities.
Advisory timeline — how active is this episode
This is not an eruption or a storm — it is a spike in a GNSS-interference environment that aircraft over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant have flown through for months. The chart below is our cell-level detection signal: the daily share of tracked aircraft over the Beirut grid cell (34°N 35°E) whose broadcasts flag low navigation integrity (NIC) — the broad ADS-B indicator that a receiver has lost confidence in its GNSS position. It sat in an 11%–53% band across 10–20 August, then jumped to 72% (101 of 140 aircraft) on 21 August, held at 72% on 22 August and has since eased — 61% on 23 August and 56% on 24 August, back toward its earlier band. Two honest caveats: this is our short cell-level series (daily aggregation for this cell begins 10 August in our data), and low-NIC is a broad flag — the stricter, jamming-grade measure is discussed below. The spike has receded on both signals and this brief is now closed. Daily low-NIC ratio:
Fig. 1 — Daily share of tracked aircraft reporting low navigation integrity (NIC) over the Beirut grid cell (34°N 35°E), % · Data as of 25 Aug 2026, 12:47 UTC · Source: Aircraft ADS-B navigation-integrity (NIC) fields, FlySafe-derived daily aggregate (public telemetry).
Airports in the exposure zone
| Airport | Size | Exposure | FIR |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) | large | — · cell 34°N 35°E · 72% low-NIC · traffic normal | OLBB |
| Damascus International Airport (DAM) | large | — · Damascus FIR · ~7% jamming-grade | OSTT |
| Larnaca International Airport (LCA) | large | — · Nicosia FIR · ~3% jamming-grade | LCCC |
| Ben Gurion International Airport (TLV) | large | — · Tel Aviv FIR · ~3% jamming-grade | LLTA |
| Queen Alia International Airport (AMM) | large | — · Amman FIR · ~1% jamming-grade | OJAC |
Distance alone does not determine impact — wind direction and the flight levels the ash reaches decide which airports and routes are affected on a given day. FIR = Flight Information Region.
What it means for flights
GNSS interference is a navigation problem, not a runway problem. Ash is an engine problem and wind is a runway problem; jamming and spoofing are a position problem — they corrupt the GNSS fix an aircraft computes. Airliners carry multiple independent navigation sources (inertial reference, DME/DME, VOR) and fly published procedures under ATC surveillance, so degraded GNSS is absorbed rather than grounding traffic. That is exactly why the Beirut cell can show 72% of aircraft flagging low navigation integrity while BEY runs a normal ~151-movement day in our feed. The operational cost is workload and margin, not cancelled flights.
Two numbers, two thresholds — and one confidence caveat. We publish two related but different measures. Low-NIC (Navigation Integrity Category below threshold) is a broad flag that a receiver's position confidence has dropped — that is the cell figure that jumped from an 11%–53% band to 72% on 21 August. Jamming-grade degradation (low NACp, position-accuracy category) is a stricter bar closer to confirmed interference — that is the FIR-level ~33% figure for the Beirut FIR (OLBB) on the same day, against a ~16% 90-day average. The honest caveat: the Beirut FIR is thinly covered in the crowdsourced network — on the order of a few hundred aircraft and only a handful of populated grid cells a day — so we label that FIR-level ratio low-confidence and lean on the cell-level low-NIC signal as the more robust read. Both are FIR/cell-level aggregates from aircraft telemetry, labelled as such; neither is a per-passenger statement.
It is regional, and Beirut reads hottest — but is least well measured. The same interference signal sits across the Eastern Mediterranean, and in our 21 August FIR aggregates the well-covered neighbours read in the single digits: the Damascus FIR (OSTT) ~6.8% jamming-grade, the Tel Aviv FIR (LLLL) ~3.3%, the Nicosia FIR (LCCC) ~2.5% and the Amman FIR (OJAC) ~1.4%, with the Ankara FIR (LTAA) ~7.5%. The Beirut FIR (OLBB) reads far higher (~33%), but on the smallest sample of the group — which is precisely why we hold that number at low confidence and watch whether the well-covered cell signal, not just the sparse FIR ratio, sustains the jump.
What would move this from a spike to an escalation. Three signals would change the story: a NOTAM series suspending GNSS-based approach procedures (RNP/RNAV) at Beirut or a neighbouring airport, a sustained multi-day jump in the stricter jamming-grade ratio corroborated by better coverage rather than a single sparse day, or diversions and go-arounds attributable to lost navigation. Our automated multi-signal analysis checks the NIC and NACp streams against NOTAM and traffic signals every three hours; this page and the BEY brief update from the same cycle, and this brief stays open until the cell flag falls back into its band for at least 48 hours.
What opened this brief. This brief has now been closed — see the close-out block below. The broad low-NIC flag over the Beirut cell (34°N 35°E) broke out of its 11%–53% band to 72% on 21 August (101 of 140 aircraft), and the elevation is not a single day: the cell read 53% on 19 August and 49% on 20 August before the jump, while the FIR-level jamming-grade measure over OLBB rose in step — 21.1% on 19 August, 20.6% on 20 August and ~33% on 21 August (177 of 537 aircraft), against a ~16% 90-day average. Two independent aggregates moving together is our bar for opening a brief; a sustained return to the prior band is our bar for closing it. Throughput has not moved — Beirut Rafic Hariri kept running at roughly 151 movements a day in our feed, with the coverage caveat noted above — because GNSS interference degrades navigation, it does not close the runway. All figures are aggregates of aircraft-broadcast navigation-integrity (NIC) and position-accuracy (NACp) telemetry from the crowdsourced ADS-B network — a floor, not a total — and the Beirut FIR figure is held at low confidence on thin coverage.
What the data showed — close-out. We are closing this brief: the spike that opened it has receded on both signals we watched. The broad low-NIC flag over the Beirut cell (34°N 35°E) peaked at 72% on 21–22 August (101 of 140, then 96 of 134 aircraft) and has eased for two days since — 61% on 23 August (94 of 155) and 56% on 24 August (89 of 158) — settling just above the 11%–53% band the cell held earlier in the month. The stricter jamming-grade ratio over the Beirut FIR (OLBB) never sustained the escalation: it read about 22% on 21 August and fell back to its coverage-thinned baseline afterwards, while every well-covered neighbouring FIR stayed in single digits through 24–25 August (Damascus (OSTT) ~8%, Amman (OJAC) ~3–5%). One honest gap to flag: OLBB's own coverage thinned to a handful of aircraft a day after 22 August, so the FIR-level ratio for 23–25 August is effectively unmeasurable — the robust read is the cell-level low-NIC signal, and that is what eased. None of the escalation signals we set out appeared — no NOTAM suspending GNSS-based approaches at Beirut or its neighbours, and no diversions or go-arounds attributable to lost navigation surfaced in our feed. Throughout, Beirut Rafic Hariri kept running normally at roughly 151 movements a day. This closes the spike, not the underlying environment: low-level GNSS interference persists across the Eastern Mediterranean, and our automated multi-signal analysis keeps watching the same NIC and NACp streams — a fresh sustained breakout would open a new brief. All figures are aggregates of aircraft-broadcast navigation-integrity (NIC) and position-accuracy (NACp) telemetry from the crowdsourced ADS-B network — a floor, not a total — and the Beirut FIR figure remains low-confidence on thin coverage.
Passenger questions, answered from the data
Airliners navigate with several independent systems, not GNSS alone, and Beirut Rafic Hariri was operating normally as of 21 August 2026 — around 151 movements a day in our feed. We publish the measured picture (navigation-integrity ratios, throughput); routing and go/no-go decisions belong to operators and authorities. Check your airline's status on the day of travel.
GNSS interference means jamming (drowning out satellite signals) or spoofing (broadcasting false ones), which degrades the position a receiver computes. In practice passengers do not notice it: flight crews cross-check against inertial and ground-based navigation and follow ATC vectors, which is why interference over the Eastern Mediterranean has persisted for months without stopping traffic. It raises crew workload and can trigger nuisance avionics alerts, not cancellations.
On 21 August 2026, about 72% of tracked aircraft over the Beirut cell flagged low navigation integrity (a broad indicator), up from an 11%–53% band earlier in the month. The stricter jamming-grade measure was about 33% over the Beirut FIR — roughly double its ~16% 90-day average — but the Beirut FIR is thinly covered, so we hold that figure at low confidence; well-covered neighbouring FIRs read in the single digits (~7% over Damascus, ~3% over Tel Aviv and Nicosia, ~1% over Amman). These are FIR- and cell-level aggregates from aircraft telemetry, reported as a floor from the crowdsourced receiver network — not a per-flight figure. By 24 August the cell flag had eased to about 56% and the jamming-grade ratio had not sustained, so this brief is now closed.
For media — the full kit
Everything on this page — charts, CSV, quotes — is published under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to FlySafe.zone. Charts come in dark (social/web) and light (print/light layouts) versions; attribution and license are embedded in every file.
“Over the Beirut grid cell, 72% of tracked aircraft — 101 of 140 on 21 August — broadcast degraded GNSS navigation integrity, a breakout above the cell's earlier 11%–53% band, while the stricter jamming-grade measure over the thinly-covered Beirut FIR ran about double its 90-day norm; yet Beirut Rafic Hariri kept operating at its normal ~151 movements a day, according to flight-monitoring service FlySafe.zone.”
Boilerplate — about the source (for your article footer)
FlySafe.zone monitors airspace risk and observed airport activity worldwide: 334 flight-information regions scored daily, GPS-interference signals, volcanic-ash exposure and daily observed movements at 493 airports from the crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network. Methodology: flysafe.zone/methodology.
Need a different cut of the data, a comment, or numbers for another airport? Leave an email — we answer fast during active events.
