Pricing Search Start free trial
// EVENT · GNSS INTERFERENCE CLOSED · NO ESCALATION — STEADY STATE DOCUMENTED Data as of 20 Aug 2026, 00:50 UTC

GNSS Interference over the Strait of Hormuz — Sharjah and the Emirates FIR, August 2026

← All airspace events

Over the Strait of Hormuz grid cell (25°N 56°E), just east of Sharjah, 65% of tracked aircraft — about 250 of 384 — broadcast low navigation integrity on 16 August, the broad ADS-B flag for degraded GNSS position confidence. The stricter, jamming-grade measure over the Emirates FIR (OMAE) stepped up from a ~3% early-August base to ~11% over the last 7 days (about 13% on the latest day), after a quieter first week of the month — the inflection our detection layer flagged. Sharjah International (SHJ) is operating normally — about 316 movements a day, in line with its own baseline: GNSS interference degrades onboard navigation, it does not close the runway. All aircraft figures are a floor from the crowdsourced ADS-B network, not a total. Close-out (20 August): the Emirates-FIR jamming-grade series held in its ~8–13% band through 18 August (8.3% on 17 August, 12.6% on 18 August) — in line with the FIR's ~12.4% 90-day average, a chronic floor rather than a climbing spike — Sharjah kept running a normal ~337-movement day, and none of the escalation signals fired; this brief is now closed as a documented steady state, with the chronic Gulf interference tracked in the live tools.
// Flying to Sharjah, Dubai or across the Gulf this week? The short version
  • Sharjah (SHJ) and its Emirates-FIR neighbours (FJR, RKT, DXB, AUH) are operating normally — GNSS interference degrades navigation avionics, it does not stop flights, and SHJ is at its usual ~316 movements a day.
  • The interference sits over the Strait of Hormuz and is chronic and region-wide: aircraft crossing the Gulf have flagged GNSS degradation for months, and the Emirates-FIR jamming-grade ratio stepped up again from ~3% to ~11–13% from 9 August.
  • What we measure is navigation integrity, not safety: two-thirds of aircraft in the strait cell flag degraded GPS confidence, but go/no-go decisions belong to operators and authorities.

Advisory timeline — how active is this episode

This is not an eruption or a storm — it is a persistent GNSS-interference environment over the Strait of Hormuz, one that aircraft crossing the Gulf have flown through for months. The chart below is the stricter, jamming-grade signal: the daily share of tracked aircraft over the Emirates FIR (OMAE) whose broadcasts flag jamming-grade GNSS degradation. It sat at a ~2–4% base in early August, stepped up around 9 August to ~10%, and then held in a ~8–13% band through 18 August — 13% on 16 and 18 August, 8.3% on 17 August — the inflection our detection layer flagged, which plateaued rather than climbing further. Three honest caveats: this is a FIR-level aggregate (labelled as such, not a per-flight figure), the broad cell-level flag over the strait is much higher (see below), and the series runs through 18 August because that is the latest ingested crowdsourced day — 19–20 August are not yet in the feed. The band never broke out and no escalation signal fired, so this brief is now closed as a documented steady state (see the close-out below). Daily jamming-grade ratio:

4
6 Aug
2
7 Aug
3
8 Aug
10
9 Aug
11
10 Aug
9
11 Aug
11
12 Aug
11
13 Aug
10
14 Aug
10
15 Aug
13
16 Aug
8
17 Aug
13
18 Aug

Fig. 1 — Daily share of tracked aircraft flagging jamming-grade GNSS degradation over the Emirates FIR (OMAE), % · Data as of 20 Aug 2026, 00:50 UTC · Source: Aircraft ADS-B navigation-integrity fields aggregated per FIR; FlySafe-derived daily aggregate from the crowdsourced receiver network (public telemetry).

Airports in the exposure zone

AirportSizeExposureFIR
Sharjah International Airport (SHJ) large — · Emirates FIR · nearest major hub · traffic normal ~316/day OMAE
Fujairah International Airport (FJR) small — · in cell 25°N 56°E · Gulf of Oman coast at the strait OMAE
Ras Al Khaimah International Airport (RKT) medium — · Emirates FIR · northern approaches · traffic normal OMAE
Dubai International Airport (DXB) large — · Emirates FIR · ~11% jamming-grade · traffic normal OMAE
Zayed International Airport (AUH) large — · Emirates FIR · traffic normal OMAE
Al Maktoum International Airport (DWC) large — · Emirates FIR OMAE
Muscat International Airport (MCT) large — · Muscat FIR · Musandam side of the strait · ~7% jamming-grade OOMM
Bandar Abbas International Airport (BND) medium — · Tehran FIR · Iranian side of the strait · ~6% jamming-grade OIIX

Distance alone does not determine impact — wind direction and the flight levels the ash reaches decide which airports and routes are affected on a given day. FIR = Flight Information Region.

We are deliberately not plotting a traffic gauge here, because for GNSS interference it would be the wrong instrument: jamming and spoofing degrade what aircraft avionics compute, not how many aircraft move. Sharjah has good ADS-B coverage and the counts are clear — Sharjah International (SHJ) ran about 337 movements a day over the closing week (its 16 August throughput is a receiver-coverage gap day, excluded from that average), which its own brief scores as a normal day (in line with a ~330 baseline). Its Emirates-FIR neighbours Fujairah (FJR), Ras Al Khaimah (RKT), Dubai (DXB) and Abu Dhabi (AUH) are all reading normal too. The meaningful signal is navigation integrity, shown in the cadence chart above; the throughput number is here only to make the point that a two-thirds low-integrity ratio over the strait cell and a normal traffic day coexist. Live view: SHJ airport brief.

What it means for flights

GNSS interference is a navigation problem, not a runway problem. Ash is an engine problem and wind is a runway problem; jamming and spoofing are a position problem — they corrupt the GNSS fix an aircraft computes. Airliners carry multiple independent navigation sources (inertial reference, DME/DME, VOR) and fly published procedures under ATC surveillance, so degraded GNSS is absorbed rather than grounding traffic. That is exactly why the Strait of Hormuz cell can show two-thirds of aircraft flagging low navigation integrity while Sharjah runs a normal ~316-movement day. The operational cost is workload and margin, not cancelled flights.

Two numbers, two thresholds — read them precisely. We publish two related but different measures. Low navigation integrity is a broad flag that a receiver's position confidence has dropped — that is the 65% figure for the strait cell (25°N 56°E), about 250 of 384 tracked aircraft on 16 August. Jamming-grade degradation is a stricter bar closer to confirmed interference — that is the FIR-level ~11% figure for the Emirates FIR (OMAE), plotted above. Both are FIR/cell-level aggregates from aircraft telemetry, labelled as such; neither is a per-passenger statement, and the gap between them is the point, not a contradiction.

It is a Strait-of-Hormuz pattern, not a Sharjah event. The same signal sits across the Gulf and its chokepoint. In our recent FIR aggregates the Emirates FIR (OMAE) reads ~11% jamming-grade over the last 7 days — up from ~4% the previous week, which is the step-up this page tracks — while the Muscat FIR (OOMM) on the Omani side of the strait reads ~7%, the Tehran FIR (OIIX) on the Iranian side ~6% and the Bahrain FIR (OBBB) ~3–4%. We hold back on thinly-covered FIRs where only a handful of aircraft are seen per snapshot, because a high ratio on two aircraft is noise, not a measurement.

What would change this story. Three signals would move it from steady-state to escalation: a NOTAM series suspending GNSS-based approach procedures (RNP/RNAV) at a major Gulf airport, a sustained further climb in the stricter jamming-grade ratio rather than the broad flag, or diversions and go-arounds attributable to lost navigation. Our automated multi-signal analysis checks the navigation-integrity streams against NOTAM and traffic signals every three hours; this page and the SHJ brief update from the same cycle.

What the data showed — close-out, 20 August. This brief tracked an inflection, and the honest close is that the inflection plateaued rather than escalating. Over the full window the Emirates-FIR (OMAE) jamming-grade ratio stepped up around 9 August and then held in a ~8–13% band through 18 August — 12.6% on 16 August (1,810 of 14,396 tracked aircraft), 8.3% on 17 August (1,214 of 14,649), 12.6% on 18 August (1,798 of 14,224) — never sustaining a climb beyond it and sitting in line with the FIR's ~12.4% 90-day average, i.e. a chronic floor, not a fresh spike. Its Strait-of-Hormuz neighbours ended in the same range on 18 August: the Muscat FIR (OOMM) at ~6.5%, the Tehran FIR (OIIX) at ~6.1% and the Bahrain FIR (OBBB) at ~8.5% — each within a point or two of its own 90-day norm. Throughput never moved: Sharjah International averaged about 337 movements a day over the closing week (its 16 August figure is a receiver-coverage gap day, excluded from that average), in line with its ~330 baseline, and its Emirates-FIR neighbours read normal too. None of the escalation signals set out above fired — no NOTAM series suspending GNSS-based approaches, no sustained jump in the jamming-grade ratio, no navigation-attributed diversions or go-arounds. With the inflection plateaued and no escalation, we are closing this brief as a documented steady state; the chronic Gulf interference floor persists and remains tracked in the SHJ brief and the live regional GPS-interference map. The daily jamming-grade series runs through 18 August, the latest ingested crowdsourced day; 19–20 August are not yet in the feed. All figures are aggregates of aircraft-broadcast navigation-integrity and position-accuracy telemetry from the crowdsourced ADS-B network — a floor, not a total.

Passenger questions, answered from the data

Is it safe to fly to Sharjah or Dubai with the GPS interference?

Airliners navigate with several independent systems, not GNSS alone, and the Emirates airports were operating normally as of 17 August 2026 — Sharjah (SHJ) at about 316 movements a day, in line with its baseline, and Dubai reading normal too. We publish the measured picture (navigation-integrity ratios, throughput); routing and go/no-go decisions belong to operators and authorities. Check your airline's status on the day of travel.

What is GNSS interference and does it affect my flight?

GNSS interference means jamming (drowning out satellite signals) or spoofing (broadcasting false ones), which degrades the position a receiver computes. In practice passengers do not notice it: flight crews cross-check against inertial and ground-based navigation and follow ATC vectors, which is why interference over the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has persisted for months without stopping traffic. It raises crew workload and can trigger nuisance avionics alerts, not cancellations.

How bad is the GNSS interference over the Strait of Hormuz right now?

As of 17 August 2026, about 65% of tracked aircraft over the strait cell (25°N 56°E) flagged low navigation integrity (a broad indicator), while the stricter jamming-grade measure was near 11% over the Emirates FIR, ~7% over the Muscat FIR, ~6% over the Tehran FIR and ~3–4% over the Bahrain FIR. These are FIR- and cell-level aggregates from aircraft telemetry, reported as a floor from the crowdsourced receiver network — not a per-flight figure. Through 18 August the Emirates-FIR jamming-grade measure held in its ~8–13% band (8.3% on 17 August, 12.6% on 18 August), in line with its ~12.4% 90-day average, and no escalation signal fired; this brief was closed on 20 August as a documented steady state, with the chronic Gulf floor still tracked in the live tools.

For media — the full kit

Everything on this page — charts, CSV, quotes — is published under CC BY 4.0: free to reuse with attribution to FlySafe.zone. Charts come in dark (social/web) and light (print/light layouts) versions; attribution and license are embedded in every file.

// Copy-paste quote

“Over the Strait of Hormuz grid cell east of Sharjah, about two-thirds of tracked aircraft — roughly 250 of 384 on 16 August — broadcast degraded GNSS navigation integrity, and the jamming-grade ratio over the Emirates FIR stepped up from about 3% to 11–13% from 9 August, yet Sharjah International kept operating at its normal ~316 movements a day, according to flight-monitoring service FlySafe.zone.”

Chart: advisory cadence
PNG · 1600px · attribution baked in
Daily share of tracked aircraft flagging jamming-grade GNSS degradation over the Emirates FIR (OMAE), % — light version preview
↓ Data behind the charts — CSV CC BY 4.0 · dates + daily values, ready for your own chart
Boilerplate — about the source (for your article footer)

FlySafe.zone monitors airspace risk and observed airport activity worldwide: 334 flight-information regions scored daily, GPS-interference signals, volcanic-ash exposure and daily observed movements at 493 airports from the crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network. Methodology: flysafe.zone/methodology.

Need a different cut of the data, a comment, or numbers for another airport? Leave an email — we answer fast during active events.

No newsletters — we only reply to this request. Press page
// Cite this
"FlySafe.zone — GNSS Interference over the Strait of Hormuz — Sharjah and the Emirates FIR, August 2026", https://flysafe.zone/events/gnss-shj-2026-08/, data as of 20 Aug 2026, 00:50 UTC — free to cite with a link. GNSS-degradation figures are derived from aircraft-broadcast navigation-integrity and position-accuracy fields; the cell figure is the broad low-integrity flag and the FIR figure is the stricter jamming-grade ratio, both aggregated from the crowdsourced ADS-B receiver network. All aircraft figures are a floor, not a total; no regulator or vendor names are attached. Method: /methodology/ · Press: /press/.

Related coverage